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We present a model of market competition and product di↵erentiation in which consumers’ at-
tention is drawn to the products’ most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via
their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of each product then a↵ects how other prod-
ucts are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some
markets exhibit “commoditized” price salient equilibria, while others exhibit “de-commoditized”
quality salient equilibria. When the costs of quality change, innovation can lead to radical shifts in
markets. In the context of ﬁnancial innovation, the model generates the phenomenon of “reaching
for yield”.1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers’ attention to particular attributes of a product seems critical.
In fashion goods, business class airline seats, and ﬁnancial products, consumers focus on
quality rather than price. In these markets, ﬁrms advertise quality to draw consumers’
attention. In fast food, regular air travel, or standard home goods, consumers seem much
more attentive to prices. In these markets, ﬁrms typically advertise their low prices.
Scholars of strategy and marketing are keenly aware of these distinct modes of market
competition, and tirelessly emphasize the importance of having di↵erentiated attributes and
drawing consumer attention to them (Levitt 1983, Rangan and Bowman 1992, Mauborgne
and Kim 2005). Southwest wants to be known as “the low cost airline;” Singapore as the
winner of prizes for luxury and comfort. Walmart touts its everyday low prices, Nordstrom’s
its service. Successful ﬁrms “frame” competition by focusing consumers’ attention on their
best attribute (quality or price). These mechanisms do not arise naturally in standard
economic models, in which consumers attend to all product attributes equally.
This paper seeks to understand these phenomena. We take a standard model in which
ﬁrms compete on quality and price, and add to it the mechanism of salience we developed
elsewhere (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012, 2013). According to salience theory, the
attention of decision makers is drawn to the most unusual, surprising, or salient attributes
of the options they face, leading them to overweight these attributes in their decisions. As
shown in BGS (2013), salience theory applied to consumer choice can shed light on a host of
lab and ﬁeld evidence on consumers’ context dependent behavior. Such context dependence
is well established in experiments, including the well known decoy e↵ects (Huber, Payne and
Puto 1982) and compromise e↵ects (Simonson 1989). More recently, Hastings and Shapiro
(2013) show using ﬁeld data that after a parallel increase in the prices of all gas grades
the demand for premium gas drops to an extent that cannot be accounted for by standard
income e↵ects. The salience model accounts for this evidence by recognizing that surprising
price hikes focus consumer attention on gas prices, rather than quality, favoring the choice
of cheaper gas grades.
The inﬂuence of prices and qualities on consumer attention has signiﬁcant implicationsfor market competition. In competitive markets, the salience of price and quality are en-
dogenously determined as the ﬁrms’ strategic choices, and create an attention externality
that lies at the heart of our model. A very high quality good draws attention not only to its
own quality, but also to the fact that the competitor product has lower quality, reducing the
competitor’s relative valuation. A good with a very low price draws attention to the com-
petitor’s higher price, reducing the competitor’s relative valuation. When salience matters,
part of product market competition is that for consumer attention via the choice of quality
and price.
We show that, depending on the cost of producing quality, some markets exhibit price
salient equilibria in which consumers are most attentive to prices and less sensitive to quality
di↵erences. In these markets ﬁrms compete on prices, and quality could be under-provided
relative to the e cient level. Because consumers neglect quality, escaping such “commodity
magnets” is di cult. Fast food and budget air travel can be described in this way.
In other markets, equilibria are quality salient in that consumers are attentive to quality
and are to some extent insensitive to price di↵erences. Firms compete on quality, which can
be over-supplied relative to the e cient level. In these markets, it is again di cult to escape
the high quality equilibrium, because consumers neglect price cuts. We think of ﬁnancial
services or fashion as well described by such equilibria.
We investigate how market equilibrium depends on the cost of providing quality. We
explore the possibility of radical change in markets when the cost of producing quality
changes dramatically. This can take the form of de-commoditization, whereby a ﬁrm acquires
access to a technology of producing quality at a much lower cost than its competitor, and
is able to change the market from a price-salient to a quality-salient equilibrium. In such
markets, prices can rise dramatically, but quality as perceived by consumers rises more.
Market transformation can also take the form of commoditization, which arises when industry
costs fall dramatically, so that large price cuts become possible. As price becomes salient,
and quality di↵erences are neglected, ﬁrms reduce quality provision in order to cut prices
even more.
Some of these e↵ects can also arise in a traditional model, under judicious assump-
tions about consumer heterogeneity. Section 5 describes similarities and di↵erences between
2salience and the traditional approach to competition by using two real world examples: de-
commoditization of the co↵ee market after the entry of Starbucks, and commoditization of
the U.S. air travel market after deregulation in the 1980’s. One key di↵erence between the
two approaches lies in the drivers of change. In standard models, it is typically the marginal
consumers who shift in response to changes in quality or price. In our model, in contrast, the
attention and thus the price-sensitivity of all consumers changes in response to signiﬁcant
innovation. As a consequence, shifts in demand and market structure can be massive.
We conclude the analysis by considering in detail the case of ﬁnancial innovation in
the form of new products with higher expected return and risk, such as mortgage backed
securities (MBS). We show that such innovation is particularly attractive in low interest rate
environments, and when the innovation o↵ers higher returns at a moderately higher risk.
Indeed, higher returns are salient to investors when alternative yields are extremely low and
the (small) extra risk of the new product is underweighted. The model generates the well
documented phenomenon of “reaching for yield” in a psychologically intuitive way, based on
the properties of salience.1
Our paper is related to recent work on “behavioral industrial organization” (Ellison
2006, Spiegler 2011). In some models, consumers restrict their attention to a subset of
available options, the consideration set, which can be manipulated by ﬁrms by expending a
marketing cost (Spiegler and Eliaz 2011a,b and Hefti 2012), by setting a salient low price on
some products (Ellison and Ellison 2009), or by setting an inconspicuous price (de Clippel,
Eliaz and Rozen 2013). In our model, the attention externality operates within a given
consideration set.
Another strand of the literature considers the working of market competition in settings in
which some product attributes are “shrouded”, namely su ciently obscured that consumers
ﬁnd it di cult to compare them across products (Gabaix and Laibson 2006, Ellison and
Ellison 2009, Spiegler and Piccione 2012). This literature takes as given the attributes that
consumers pay attention to. In our analysis, consumers may pay di↵erential attention to
quality or price, but the neglect of one attribute or the other is endogenously determined by
1For explorations of the role of inattention in ﬁnancial markets, see Barber and Odean (2008), DellaVigna
and Pollet (2009), and Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013b).
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Azar (2008), Cunningham (2012), and Dahrem¨ oller and Fels (2012) explore models in
which the relative weight that consumers put on di↵erent attributes depends on the choice
context, and can thus be manipulated by ﬁrms. These papers model consumer attention by
using approaches di↵erent from salience (technically, they do not combine the diminishing
sensitivity and ordering properties) and explore a di↵erent set of issues, such as properties
of markups or the monopolist problem. Finally, our analysis builds on recent work relating
inattention to consumer demand. Some approaches – such as Gabaix (2012), Matˇ ejka and
McKay (2012), and Persson (2012) – are grounded in the rational inattention framework, in
which attention to di↵erent product features is e ciently allocated ex-ante. In our salience
model consumer attention to di↵erent product attributes is drawn ex-post, depending on
which attribute stands out. Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) follow a similar approach.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our basic model of competition
and show how salience would inﬂuence product valuations by consumers. In section 3, we
take qualities as ﬁxed and examine the basic analytics of price competition and of price and
quality salient equilibria. Section 4 focuses on the full model of quality competition, and
derives our main results for markets for products where attribute salience matters. In section
5, we apply the model to discuss innovation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two ﬁrms, 1 and 2. Firm k =1 ,2p r o d u c e sag o o dh a v i n gq u a l i t yqk under a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost function ck(qk). From the viewpoint of consumers, the good of ﬁrm k is
identiﬁed by its quality qk and price pk. Qualities and prices are competitively set by ﬁrms.
Following Shaked and Sutton (1982), we assume that ﬁrms play a two stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm k makes a costless commitment to produce quality qk 2 [0,+1). In
the second stage, ﬁrms set optimal prices given the quality-cost attributes they committed
to (qk,c k), for k =1 ,2, where ck ⌘ ck(qk). In light of these quality and price o↵erings,
consumers choose which product to buy. In what follows, we consider only pure strategy
Nash equilibria of this game.
4There is a measure one of identical consumers, each of whom chooses one unit of one good
from the choice set C ⌘{ (q2, p2),(q1, p1)}.2 Absent salience distortions, each consumer
values good k =1 ,2a t :
u(qk, pk)=qk   pk.( 1 )
Both qualities and prices are measured in dollars and assumed to be known to the con-
sumer. A salient thinker departs from (1) by inﬂating the weight attached to the attribute
that he perceives to be more salient in the choice set C ⌘{ (q2, p2),(q1, p1)}.
For each good k in the choice set C,i t ss a l i e n ta t t r i b u t e sa r et h o s ew h o s el e v e l sa r e
unusual or surprising, in the sense of being furthest from the reference attribute levels in
the choice set C. Following BGS (2013), we take the reference attribute levels to be the
average levels in the choice set. In the choice set C,t h er e f e r e n c eg o o di st h u s( q, p), where
p =( p1 + p2)/2a n dq =( q1 + q2)/2a r et h ea v e r a g ep r i c ea n dq u a l i t yi nt h em a r k e t .
Formally, we assume that there is a salience function   (x,y)t h a ts a t i s ﬁ e st w op r o p e r t i e s :
ordering and homogeneity of degree zero. According to ordering, if an interval [x,y]i s
contained in a larger interval [x0,y0], then   (x,y) < (x0,y0). According to homogeneity of
degree zero,   (↵x,↵y)=  (x,y)f o ra n y↵>0, with  (0,0) = 0. Ordering and homogeneity
of degree zero imply that the salience of a good’s quality is an increasing function of the
percentage di↵erence between the good’s quality and the average quality in the choice set,
and similarly for price. In particular, consumers have diminishing sensitivity to attribute
di↵erences: increasing the prices of both goods by a uniform amount ✏ makes prices less
salient,  (pk + ✏,p + ✏) <  (pk,p)f o rk =1 ,2. This property is consistent with Weber’s law
of sensorial perception (see BGS 2013).
In the choice set C,t h e n ,t h es a l i e n c eo fp r i c ef o rg o o dk is equal to   (pk,p)w h i l et h e
salience of quality for good k is equal to   (qk,q). Good k’s quality is more salient than its
price – or, for short, quality is salient – if and only if   (qk,q) > (pk,p).
2Though we consider the simplest setting in which there are only two ﬁrms, producing one good each,
and there are no outside options, the analysis can be extended to multiple goods and outside options. The
role of the outside option is not critical and Online Appendix 2 extends the model to include one. To apply
the salience framework to a more general model of market competition, the relevant market should be taken
as the deﬁnition of choice set. This process allows for some ﬂexibility in deﬁning what the alternatives of
choice are, but this ﬂexibility is similar to that involved in deﬁning a speciﬁc competitive market context in
conventional models of industrial organization.
5Given a salience ranking, the salient thinker’s perceived utility from good (qk, pk)i s
given by:
u
ST(qk, pk)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
qk    pk if quality is salient
 qk   pk if price is salient
qk   pk if equal salience
,( 2 )
where   2 [0,1] captures the extent to which valuation is distorted by salience.3 When
  = 1 valuation is rational, as it coincides with (1). When  <1, the consumer overweights
the salient attribute. The competitive equilibrium then depends on  ,a l l o w i n gu st os t u d y
how salience a↵ects market competition.
The assumptions of consumer homogeneity and rank-based salience weighting allow us
to characterize the basic implications of our framework. Consumer homogeneity provides a
clear rational benchmark against which the e↵ects of salient thinking are best illustrated.
In Online Appendix 1 we introduce heterogeneity into the model using a speciﬁcation in
which the salience of di↵erent attributes has a stochastic component that varies in the
population of otherwise identical consumers. In this formulation, the e↵ect of price and
quality changes is more continuous, and our key results continue to hold. Integrating salience
with heterogeneity in consumer tastes is an important topic for future research, particularly
with regards to testing empirically the e↵ect of salience on consumer demand.
We solve this model in two steps. In Section 3, we take each ﬁrm’s quality and cost (qk,c k)
as given and study price competition among ﬁrms. This price setting stage is of independent
interest from endogenous quality choice because in the short run ﬁrms often take quality
as given, and react to cost shocks only by adjusting their prices (in some settings ﬁrms
may be unable to adjust quality, due to regulatory or technological constraints). Section 4
investigates how ﬁrms choose quality in the ﬁrst stage so as to inﬂuence price competition
in the second stage.
3Relative to BGS 2013, we omit for simplicity the normalisation factor 2
1+ .
63 Price Competition
We begin with an analysis of price competition between ﬁrms 1 and 2, assuming that qualities
q1,q 2 and costs c1,c 2 are ﬁxed, and only prices are set by ﬁrms. We assume that ﬁrm 1 has
aw e a k l yh i g h e rq u a l i t ya n dc o s tt h a nﬁ r m2 ,n a m e l yq1   q2 and c1   c2 (in Sections 3 and
4 the ranking of quality and costs is determined endogenously). Before characterizing the
outcome under salience, consider the rational benchmark that obtains when   =1 .
Lemma 1 When   =1 , the equilibrium under price competition is as follows:
i) If q1 c1 >q 2 c2, the consumer buys the high quality good 1. Prices are p1 = c2+(q1 q2)
and p2 = c2. The proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is equal to ⇡1 =( q1   q2)   (c1   c2).
ii) If q1   c1 <q 2   c2, the consumer buys the low quality good 2. Prices are p1 = c1 and
p2 = c1   (q1   q2). The proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is equal to ⇡2 =( c1   c2)   (q1   q2).
iii) If q1 c1 = q2 c2, the consumer is indi↵erent between the high and the low quality good.
Prices are p1 = c1 and p2 = c2. Firms make zero proﬁts.
In the rational model, the ﬁrm creating greater surplus qk ck captures the entire market
and makes a proﬁt equal to the di↵erential surplus created.4 When, as in case iii), the
two goods yield the same surplus, ﬁrms share the market and make zero proﬁts, as in
standard Bertrand competition. The benchmark of fully homogeneous goods and zero proﬁts
corresponds to the special case q1 = q2 = q,a n dc1 = c2 = c.
To see how salience a↵ects price competition, suppose that the ﬁrm producing the low
quality product 2 sets price p2  p1. The next section shows that this always holds in
equilibrium. Homogeneity of degree zero of the salience function then implies that the same
attribute – either quality or price – is salient for both goods. In particular, quality is salient
(that is, quality is more salient than price for both goods) provided:
q1
q2
>
p1
p2
,( 3 )
4In principle, the price competition game has multiple equilibria, corresponding to di↵erent price levels
the losing ﬁrm may set leading to zero demand for its good. We reﬁne the set of equilibria by assuming that
the ﬁrm that loses the market sets price equal to production cost (as setting price below cost might entail
negative proﬁts). See Appendix A, footnote 17 for details.
7namely if the proportional di↵erence between qualities is higher than that between prices.
Equivalently, quality is salient when the high quality good has a higher quality to price ratio
than the low quality good (i.e., q1/p1 >q 2/p2). Price is salient if and only if the reverse of
Equation (2) holds, that is, if the low quality good has a better quality to price ratio than the
high quality good (i.e., q1/p1 <q 2/p2). Because by Equation (2) the good that fares better
along the salient attribute is overvalued relative to the other good, salience tilts preferences
in favor of the good that has the highest ratio of quality to price (BGS 2013).
According to Equation (2), the valuation of a good depends not just on the good’s char-
acteristics but also on the entire competitive context. If qualities vary more than prices
across all choice options, the consumer pays more attention to (overweights) quality di↵er-
ences when making his choice. If prices vary more than qualities, the reverse is true. This
implies that, by changing its price, a ﬁrm exerts an “attention externality” on the compet-
ing good. To see this, recall that q1 >q 2 and p1 >p 2, and suppose the high quality ﬁrm
reduces its price p1. This change does not simply improve the consumer’s valuation of good
1: by making prices less salient, it also draws the consumer’s attention to the low quality
of good 2. Suppose, alternatively, that the low quality ﬁrm reduces its price p2.T h i sd o e s
not only improve the consumer’s valuation of good 2: by making prices more salient, it also
draws his attention to the high price of good 1. In other words, by cutting its price a ﬁrm
draws the consumer’s attention to the attribute along which it fares better. As this attention
externality makes price cuts more e↵ective in attracting consumers, it seems that it should
strengthen competitive forces. As we will see, however, this is not always the case.
3.1 Salience and Competitive Pricing
When a ﬁrm sells to salient thinkers, it sets its price to render salient the advantage of its
product relative to its competitor. To explore how salience a↵ects competitive pricing, we
examine price setting in two opposite situations, one in which quality is salient and ﬁrm 1
wins the market, another in which price is salient and ﬁrm 2 wins the market.
Consider ﬁrst the optimal price set by the high quality ﬁrm 1 in order to win a quality-
salient market. Suppose that ﬁrm 2 has set a price p2 for q2.T h em a x i m a lp r i c ep1 at which
8ﬁrm 1 lures the consumer into buying its product while keeping quality salient solves:
max
p1 p2
p1   c1
s.t. q1    p1   q2    p2,( 4 )
q1/p1   q2/p2.( 5 )
Constraint (4) ensures that the consumer prefers good 1 when quality is salient, while
constraint (5) ensures that quality is indeed salient. There are two departures from the
rational case. On the one hand, ﬁrm 1 now has an additional reason to cut its price: by
setting p1 low enough, it makes quality salient in (5), inducing the consumer to buy its
high quality product. On the other hand, when quality is salient the high quality good is
over-valued, which may allow ﬁrm 1 to hike its price p1 above the rational equilibrium level.
This e↵ect of salience is captured by Equation (4).
Consider next the optimal price set by the low cost ﬁrm 2 to win a price salient market.
The maximal price p2 at which ﬁrm 2 lures the consumer into buying its product while
keeping prices salient solves:
max
p2p1
p2   c2
s.t.  q2   p2    q1   p1,( 6 )
q2/p2   q1/p1.( 7 )
Once again, price setting is constrained by consumer participation and salience. On the
one hand, salience provides ﬁrm 2 with an additional incentive to cut its price. By lowering
p2,ﬁ r m2d o e sn o tj u s tm a k ei t sp r o d u c tm o r ea t t r a c t i v e ,i ta l s om a k e si t sl o w e rp r i c es a l i e n t ,
inducing the consumer to buy its cheaper product. This e↵ect is captured by (7). On the
other hand, by causing an over-valuation of the cheap good, salience can allow ﬁrm 2 to
charge a higher price than in the rational case. This e↵ect is captured by (6).
This preliminary analysis suggests that, depending on the balance between the salience
and participation constraints, salient thinking may boost or dampen prices relative to a
rational world. To see which force dominates, we now characterise equilibrium prices under
9salience. To do so, we make the simplifying parametric restriction:
A.1:  (c1   c2) <q 1   q2 < 1
 (c1   c2).
Assumption A.1 ensures that salience fully determines the preference of consumers among
goods when prices are equal to production costs. If quality is salient, consumers prefer the
high quality good 1; if price is salient they prefer the cheap good 2. As evident from A.1,
this is akin to assuming that the two ﬁrms produce su ciently similar surpluses qk  ck that
changes in salience change the consumer’s preference ranking. Under A.1, we can characterise
which ﬁrm wins the market. Appendix A contains all the proofs.
Proposition 1 Under A.1, pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria under price competition
satisfy:
i) if
q1
c1 >
q2
c2, quality is salient, the consumer buys the high quality good, and prices are
p1 =m i n {q1 ·
c2
q2
,c 2 +
1
 
(q1   q2)} and p2 = c2.
ii) if
q1
c1 <
q2
c2, price is salient, the consumer buys the low quality good, and prices are
p1 = c1 and p2 =m i n {q2 ·
c1
q1
,c 1    (q1   q2)}.
iii) if
q1
c1 =
q2
c2, quality and price are equally salient, the consumer buys the good delivering
the highest (rational) surplus qk   ck, and prices are
p1 = c1 and p2 = c2.
Under salience, the market equilibrium critically depends on the quality to cost ratios
qk/ck of di↵erent products. A ﬁrm with a higher ratio qk/ck monopolizes the market and
makes positive proﬁts. When the two ﬁrms have identical quality to cost ratios, they earn
zero proﬁts in the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1 holds because the ﬁrm having the highest quality to cost ratio can always
engineer a price cut turning salience in its favor. When q1/c1 >q 2/c2,t h eh i g hq u a l i t yﬁ r m
can set a su ciently low price that quality becomes salient, monopolizing the market. The
10low quality ﬁrm is unable to reverse this outcome: in fact, doing so would require it to cut
price below cost. When instead q1/c1 <q 2/c2,t h el o wq u a l i t yﬁ r mc a ns e tp r i c es u   c i e n t l y
low so that price is salient, and it monopolizes the market. The high quality ﬁrm is unable to
reverse this outcome: once again, doing so would require it to cut price below cost. Finally,
consider the case in which q1/c1 = q2/c2.I nt h i sc a s e ,s a l i e n c ec h a n g e sa ss o o na saﬁ r mt r i e s
to set its price above cost. In particular, as soon as a ﬁrm tries to extract some consumer
surplus, its disadvantage becomes salient and the price hike becomes self defeating. The only
equilibrium outcome is zero proﬁts for both ﬁrms.
The central role of the quality to cost ratio is economically appealing because it pins
down salience distortions in terms of average costs of quality ck/qk. As we show when we
endogenize quality, this feature allows our model to make tight predictions about how changes
in cost structure a↵ect salience and market outcomes. Before turning to that analysis, it is
useful to look more closely at some implications of Proposition 1.
3.2 Price salient vs. Quality salient equilibria
Depending on the quality and cost parameters, salience leads to two types of equilibria:
price salient and quality salient. In quality salient equilibria (case i of Proposition 1), con-
sumers’ attention is drawn to quality and they pay less attention to prices. This resembles
de-commoditized markets described in the marketing literature. In contrast, in price salient
equilibria (case ii), consumers’ attention is drawn to prices and they neglect quality dif-
ferences among goods. This resembles the canonical description of commoditised markets
(Rangan and Bowman 1992).
According to Proposition 1, in both types of equilibria the proﬁts of the winning ﬁrm
can be either lower or higher than in the rational benchmark. To see this, note that - due to
the salience constraint - the equilibrium proﬁts of the winning ﬁrm k (the one with lowest
average cost) must satisfy:
⇡
S
k  qk ·
c k
q k
  ck = qk

c k
q k
 
ck
qk
 
,( 8 )
where equality holds when the salience constraint binds. Equation (8) shows that equilibrium
11proﬁts increase in the di↵erence between the ﬁrms’ average cost of quality. Consider the
following special cases:
• The two goods yield di↵erent surpluses q1  c1 6= q2  c2 but exhibit identical (similar)
average costs of quality. Under rationality, the high surplus ﬁrm would make positive
proﬁts. Under salient thinking, in contrast, industry proﬁts are zero (negligible). Intu-
itively, when average costs of quality are identical (similar), a ﬁrm can always undercut
its competitor and render its advantage salient. Price cuts are thus very e↵ective and
proﬁts are lower than under rationality.
• The two goods yield the same surplus q1 c1 = q2 c2,b u td i ↵ e ri nt h e i ra v e r a g ec o s t s
of quality. Here, proﬁts are zero under rationality, but positive under salient thinking.
The reason is that the ﬁrm with the lower average cost of quality can set a price above
cost and still be perceived as o↵ering a better deal than its competitor. Price cuts by
the losing ﬁrm are ine↵ective, and salience dampens competitive forces.
Salience can create abnormal proﬁts in both quality and price salient equilibria. In quality
salient equilibria, consumers overvalue the high quality good. The high quality ﬁrm is then
able to hike prices and earn high proﬁts. Financial services and fashion may be examples of
this type of competition. In price salient equilibria, consumers are attentive to prices and
under-appreciate quality di↵erences among products. This grants an extra advantage to the
cheap (and low quality) ﬁrm, allowing it to raise the price above cost.5 Fast-food industry
and low-cost airlines may be examples of this type of competition.
4 Optimal Quality Choice
We now examine endogenous quality choice in the two-stage game introduced in Section
1. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm k =1 ,2m a k e sac o s t l e s sc o m m i t m e n tt op r o d u c eq u a l i t y
qk 2 [0,+1). In the second stage, ﬁrms compete in prices given the quality-cost attributes
each ﬁrm committed to (qk,c k(qk)), for k =1 ,2. We denote by ck(q)t h ei n c r e a s i n ga n d
5This result extends to industry proﬁts as a whole, namely the sum of the proﬁts of both ﬁrms.
12convex cost of ﬁrm k in producing the quality q it committed to, where k =1 ,2.6 Cost
functions are common knowledge.
We assume that ﬁrm 1 is the low cost ﬁrm, in the sense that it has weakly lower total
and marginal costs of quality than ﬁrm 2. Formally, c1(q)  c2(q)a n dc0
1(q)  c0
2(q)f o r
all qualities q. The cost function has a ﬁxed and a variable component. Formally, ck(q)=
Fk +vk(q), where vk(q)i sa ni n c r e a s i n ga n dc o n v e xf u n c t i o ns a t i s f y i n gvk(0) = 0. To obtain
intuitive closed form solutions, we sometimes use the quadratic form:
ck(q)=Fk +
ck
2
· q
2,f o rk =1 ,2, where c1  c2 and F1  F2.( 9 )
The critical question is whether the low cost of quality ﬁrm 1 will choose to produce higher
or lower quality than the high cost of quality ﬁrm 2, and what this implies for the equilibrium
market outcome.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the rational benchmark. In stage 2, the market is monopolized by
ﬁrm k producing the highest surplus qk   ck(qk). Anticipating this, at t =1t h et w oﬁ r m s
set their qualities as follows.
Lemma 2 Under rationality, it is (weakly) optimal for ﬁrm k =1 ,2 to set q⇤
k such that:
c
0
k(q
⇤
k)=1 . (10)
a) If ﬁrms have the same marginal cost of quality v0
1(q)=v0
2(q)=v0(q), they set identical
quality levels q⇤
1 = q⇤
2 = q⇤. Firm 1 sets price p⇤
1 = c2(q⇤) and monopolizes the market
(making positive proﬁts) if and only if F1 <F 2.I fF1 = F2, equilibrium proﬁts are zero.
b) If ﬁrm 1 has a lower marginal cost of quality than 2, namely v0
1(q) <v 0
2(q), then it
commits to higher quality q⇤
1 >q ⇤
2 and monopolizes the market (making positive proﬁts) by
setting p⇤
1 = c2(q⇤
2)+( q⇤
1   q⇤
2).
By choosing the surplus-maximizing quality in (10), each ﬁrm maximizes its chance to
6This implies, plausibly, that a ﬁrm’s marginal cost of quality increases with the quality it produces.
Results would change under the alternative assumption that the marginal cost of producing the good does
not depend on q but ﬁrms must incur a variable cost H(q) at t = 0 to produce quality q at t = 1. Abstracting
from the issue of ﬁrm entry or exit (thus taking as given the presence of the two ﬁrms in the market), in
that case quality will always be salient at t = 1 and only quality-salient equilibria would exist.
13win the market.7 If ﬁrms have identical costs c1(q)=c2(q), they produce homogeneous
goods, split the market, and make no proﬁts. If instead ﬁrm 1 has strictly lower costs than
ﬁrm 2, it captures the entire market and makes positive proﬁts. Firm 1 then provides higher
quality if and only its marginal cost of quality is lower than that of ﬁrm 2.
Under the quadratic cost function of Equation (9), ﬁrm k sets its quality at the level:
q
⇤
k =
1
ck
,
which intuitively increases as the marginal cost falls (as ck becomes smaller), but is indepen-
dent of F. In the rational model, a drop in the marginal cost of quality for all ﬁrms increases
equilibrium quality, while a drop in the ﬁxed cost of quality F leaves quality una↵ected.
4.1 Salience and Quality Choice
Consider now how salience a↵ects quality choice. To build intuition , suppose that the two
ﬁrms have identical costs of quality c1(q)=c2(q)=c(q). Suppose that ﬁrms are at the
“rational” quality level q⇤,w h i c hi sp i n n e dd o w nb yt h eo p t i m a l i t yc o n d i t i o nc0(q⇤)=1 .I f
consumers are salient thinkers, would ﬁrm 1 have an incentive to deviate from the ﬁrst best
quality q⇤?
Consider the incentive of ﬁrm 1 to choose a lower quality, cheaper, product. The new
product has quality q0 = q⇤    q and cost c(q0)=c(q⇤)    c. Whether this new product is
successful or not against q⇤ critically relies on salience. If the lower quality q0 is salient, the
new product fails. If instead the lower price is salient, the new product may be successful.
By Proposition 1, price is salient if and only if the quality to cost ratio of q0 is higher than
that of product q⇤:
q⇤    q
c(q⇤)    c
>
q⇤
c(q⇤)
,
 c
 q
>
c(q⇤)
q⇤ .( 1 1 )
A cost cutting deviation works if the marginal cost of quality  c/ q is higher than the
7If ﬁrm 1 has strictly lower costs than ﬁrm 2, then in equilibrium ﬁrm 2 loses the market. Firm 2 is
then indi↵erent to deviating to a di↵erent quality than the one entailed by (10). In principle, there may
be multiple equilibria, each corresponding to a di↵erent quality level chosen by ﬁrm 2. We reﬁne the set of
Nash equilibria by assuming that ﬁrm 2 chooses the surplus maximizing quality, which is a weakly dominant
strategy.
14average cost c(q⇤)/q⇤ at the rational equilibrium. This is intuitive: when the marginal cost
is high, a small quality reduction greatly reduces the cost of ﬁrm 1. This allows ﬁrm 1 to set
as a l i e n tl o wp r i c e ,a n dt ow i nt h em a r k e t .
The attention externality plays a key role here. As prices become salient, consumers pay
less attention to quality, which reduces consumer valuation of the quality q0 o↵ered by the
deviating ﬁrm. This e↵ect may undermine the proﬁtability of the new product. However,
because price becomes salient for both ﬁrms, the valuation by consumers of the competing
product q⇤ drops even more! It is precisely this externality that allows the quality reduction
to be proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1.
Consider the alternative move whereby ﬁrm 1 deviates to a higher quality product q0 =
q⇤+ q,w h i c he n t a i l sah i g h e rc o s tc(q0)=c(q⇤)+ c.I ft h eh i g h e rp r i c eo fq0 is salient, the
deviation fails. If however its higher quality is salient, the new product may be successful.
This scenario occurs provided:
q⇤ +  q
c(q⇤)+  c
>
q⇤
c(q⇤)
,
 c
 q
<
c(q⇤)
q⇤ .( 1 2 )
Aq u a l i t yi m p r o v i n gd e v i a t i o nc a nw o r kp r o v i d e dt h em a r g i n a lc o s to fq u a l i t yi sb e l o wt h e
average cost at the rational equilibrium. Intuitively, if the marginal cost is low, a large
quality improvement entails only a small price hike, making quality salient. Once again,
the attention externality is at work. The salience of quality boosts consumer valuation of
the new product, but it also draws the consumer’s attention to the low quality q⇤ of the
competing product. These e↵ects cause a relative over-valuation of the high quality product
q0,a l l o w i n gt h ed e v i a t i n gﬁ r mt om a k ep r o ﬁ t s .
This discussion delivers two messages. First, salience creates incentives to deviate away
from the rational equilibrium. Second, the deviation can be toward higher or lower quality
depending on the relationship between marginal and average costs of quality. In equilibrium,
quality is generally provided at ine cient levels.
To further explore these forces, let us consider the general case in which ﬁrms have
di↵erent cost of quality functions, ck(q) 6= cj(q). Suppose that ﬁrm j has set the quality
level qj.T h eb e s tr e s p o n s eo fﬁ r mk is then as follows.
15Lemma 3 The best response qbr
k of ﬁrm k to its opponent’s quality qj satisﬁes:
i) weakly higher quality qbr
k   qj provided c0
k(qj) <c j(qj)/qj,
ii) weakly lower quality qbr
k  qj provided c0
k(qj) >c j(qj)/qj.
Both inequalities above are strict provided cj(qj)/qj 2 ( ,1/ ).
According to the salience constraint in (5) and (7), the maximum price per unit of quality
that ﬁrm k can extract while still having its advantage salient is equal to the average cost
cj(qj)/qj of the competing ﬁrm j. As a consequence, ﬁrm k optimally raises quality when
the marginal cost c0
k(qj)o fq u a l i t yi sl o w e rt h a nt h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁ tcj(qj)/qj.T h e ﬁ r m
optimally lowers quality when the reverse is true.
This mechanism implies that when the average cost of quality is high, the consumer
is willing to pay a high price and still perceive quality as salient. In particular, when
cj(qj)/qj > 1, consumers overpay for quality and ﬁrm k has an incentive to over-provide
it (relative to the rational benchmark c0
k(q⇤
k)=1 ) . I nc o n t r a s t ,w h e nt h ea v e r a g ec o s to f
quality is low, even a slight price increase is very salient. In this case, ﬁrm k beneﬁts from
cutting both quality and price. In particular, when cj(qj)/qj < 1ﬁ r mk under-provides
quality relative to the rational benchmark.
To describe the market equilibrium, we focus on the symmetric case in which the two
ﬁrms have the same cost function c1(q)=c2(q)=c(q). This case captures the long run
outcome arising when all ﬁrms, through imitation or entry, end up adopting the best available
technology.
Proposition 2 When  <1 and ﬁrms have identical cost functions, the unique pure strat-
egy equilibrium is symmetric. Denote by q and q the quality levels such that c0(q)=1 / 
and c0(q)= , and by b q(F) the quality level minimizing average cost, namely b q(F) ⌘
argminc(q)/q. Then, in equilibrium price and quality are equally salient, ﬁrms make no
proﬁts, and quality provision is given by:
q
S
2 = q
S
1 = q
S ⌘
8
> > > <
> > > :
q if F > F ⌘ q/    v(q)
b q(F) if F 2
⇥
F,F
⇤
q if F < F ⌘ q    v(q)
. (13)
16This equilibrium exhibits three main features. First, because costs are identical, ﬁrms
produce the same quality, face the same production costs, and charge the same price. But
then, because ﬁrms sell identical products, price and quality are equally salient in equilibrium.
Hence, consumers value the products that are o↵ered correctly (as in the case where   =1 ) ,
and ﬁrms make zero proﬁts.
Second, although in equilibrium consumers correctly value the goods produced, there is
ine cient provision of quality (and therefore lower consumer surplus) relative to the rational
case. The reason is that salience makes the ﬁrms unwilling to deviate towards the socially
e cient quality q⇤. When quality is over-provided (qS >q ⇤), reducing quality and price
backﬁres because consumers’ attention is drawn to the quality reduction, rather than to
the price cut. This sustains an equilibrium with high quality and high prices. Similarly,
when quality is under-provided (qS <q ⇤), increases in quality and price backﬁre because
consumers focus on the price rather than the quality hike. This sustains an equilibrium with
low quality and low prices. Although in equilibrium both attributes are equally salient, we
refer to the equilibrium with quality over-provision as quality-salient and to the equilibrium
with under-provision as price-salient. This terminology underscores which salience ranking
constrains ﬁrms from deviating towards the e cient quality level.
The third key feature of the equilibrium is that - unlike in the rational case - quality
provision increases in the ﬁxed cost of quality F.8 Intuitively, F a↵ects average costs and
thus, by Lemma 3, the ﬁrms’ best responses. When F is high, costs and thus prices are
high. By the diminishing sensitivity property, the salience of prices is low. The ﬁrm has an
incentive to boost quality because any extra cost can be “hidden” behind the already high
price. As a consequence, the extra price is not salient and quality is over-provided. When
in contrast F is low, costs and thus prices are low. By diminishing sensitivity, prices are
now very salient. In this case, any price cut is immediately noticed, encouraging ﬁrms to
cut costs to an extent that quality is under-provided.
To see these e↵ects clearly, consider the case of the quadratic cost function.
Corollary 1 When  <1 and ﬁrms have identical quadratic costs c(q)=F +c·q2/2, quality
8The reason is that b q(F) satisﬁes v0(b q)·b q v(b q)=F and the left hand side is increasing in quality because
v is convex.
17provision in the symmetric equilibrium is given by:
q
S
2 = q
S
1 = q
S ⌘
8
> > > <
> > > :
1
 c if F · c> 1
2 2 q
2F
c if 1
2 2  F · c   2
2
 
c if F · c< 2
2
. (14)
Figure 1 below plots qS as a function of the unit cost F,a n dc o m p a r e si tt ot h es u r p l u s
maximizing quality, given by q⇤ =1 /c. As evident from the ﬁgure, salience causes quality
Figure 1: Quality provision in the symmetric equilibrium (quadratic cost).
to be over-provided when the ﬁxed cost F is su ciently high and under-provided otherwise.
Recall that for   =1 ,w eh a v eq⇤ =1 /c and quality provision does not depend on the ﬁxed
cost F.
This analysis may help explain why sellers of expensive goods such as fancy hotel rooms
or business class airplane seats compete mostly on the quality dimension, often providing
customers with visible quality add-ons such as champagne, airport lounges, or treats. These
visible quality add-ons help make overall product quality salient, and the proﬁt margin
associated with them can be hidden behind the high cost of the baseline good. In contrast,
sellers of cheap goods such as low quality clothes or fast food compete on the price dimension,
and cut product quality if that allows them to o↵er substantially lower prices. These cuts
are proportionally larger in the price dimension, draw consumers’ attention to prices, and
thus enable ﬁrms that supply these cheap goods to make abnormal proﬁts. In both cases,
18equilibrium proﬁts disappear as competing ﬁrms adopt the same add-on or quality cutting
strategies, despite the fact that they are providing ine cient levels of quality.9
Similar intuitions may help shed light on the technological and competitive forces leading
product attributes to be “shrouded” (e.g. Gabaix and Laibson 2006) or to the introduction
of “irrelevant” attributes (e.g. Carpenter, Glazer and Nakamoto, 1994). For instance, in a
world where all hotels charge high prices for phone usage, it may be di cult for one hotel
to cut phone charges and make that advantage salient to consumers (as opposed to other
more important dimensions of hotel quality). In this sense, hotel charges for phone usage are
shorouded. On the other hand, being the unique hotel that introduces a charge for pillows
is a competitive disadvantage that is likely to draw consumers’ attention. In this sense,
charging for pillows would not be shrouded. Such trade-o↵s can be analysed in a setting
with horizontal di↵erentiation. We leave this important topic to future work.
So far we considered only the symmetric equilibrium in which the two ﬁrms share the
same cost functions. The next section considers the e↵ects of changes to cost structures, and
in particular the case where ﬁrms have asymmetric costs.
4.2 Innovation as a Cost Shock
We now use our model to explore the implications of salience for product innovation. Suppose
am a r k e ti si nt h el o n gr u ns y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i u mo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .W ev i e wi n n o v a t i o na s
ac h a n g ei np r o d u c tc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa n dm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u mt r i g g e r e db yac o s ts h o c k . W e
distinguish industry-wide cost shocks, such as those caused by deregulation or changes input
prices, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks such as those stemming from the development of a new
technology by an individual ﬁrm. This taxonomy illustrates clearly the separate e↵ects of
the two key forces driving salience: diminishing sensitivity and ordering. Industry-wide
shocks in fact work mainly through diminishing sensitivity because they alter the average
9The diminishing sensitivity property is also present in Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
The distinctive feature of our model is the attention externality, namely the fact that changing attributes
of one product alter the valuation of the competing product. This ingredient is important to pin down
equilibrium quantities and to generate strong reactions to price or quality changes. The beneﬁt for a ﬁrm
of increasing quality (and price) is particularly large when it induces the consumer to focus more on the full
quality provided. Our model thus features a complementarity between the add-on quality and the baseline
quality.
19value of di↵erent attributes in the market. Firm-speciﬁc shocks instead work mostly through
ordering: they allow one ﬁrm’s product to stand out against those of its competitors. The
analysis of ﬁrm speciﬁc shocks allows us to describe the equilibrium in our model when ﬁrms
have di↵erent cost functions.
Real world innovation episodes often combine ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-wide factors.
Initially only some ﬁrms discover new technologies or change their strategies in response to
common shocks, so that the initial phase is e↵ectively ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Subsequently, the new
technologies or strategies spread to other ﬁrms, becoming industry-wide phenomena. One
could view our analysis as providing snapshots of short and long-run market adjustments to
shocks. We leave the modelling of industry dynamics under salience to future research.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the case of quadratic costs, in which ck(qk)=
Fk +
ck
2 · q2
k,f o rk =1 ,2. We begin our analysis by considering industry-wide shocks to an
industry in symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the market is in the equilibrium described by Equation (14).
We then have:
i) A marginal increase (decrease) in the ﬁxed cost F of all ﬁrms weakly increases (decreases)
equilibrium quality provision under salient thinking ( <1) while it leaves quality una↵ected
under rationality (  =1 ).
ii) A marginal increase (decrease) in the marginal cost of producing quality c of all ﬁrms
strictly decreases (increases) equilibrium quality provision. Under salient thinking, the change
in quality is larger than under rationality (  =1 ) if and only if in the original equilibrium
quality is su ciently over-provided.
With rational consumers, changes in the ﬁxed cost F do not a↵ect quality provision. With
salient thinkers, they do. This follows from the fact that a symmetric shock to the general
level of costs shifts competition from quality to prices or vice-versa. A drastic increase in
F reduces, by diminishing sensitivity, the salience of price di↵erences. This makes it very
attractive for ﬁrms to upgrade their quality. Conversely, a drastic reduction in F increases
the salience of price di↵erences. This makes it very attractive for ﬁrms to cut their prices.
Somewhat paradoxically, a drop in costs translates into lower quality provision.
20As an example, the transportation costs involved in exporting German cars to the United
States (akin to a rise in F relative to the home market) may cause the car manufacturers
to compete on quality provision in the US market, more than in the domestic market, by
adding quality add-ons to their cars. Similarly, tru✏es are served in omelettes in Provence,
while tru✏e “shavings” are added to elegant dishes in the United States; lobster is more
likely to be served boiled in Boston than in Chicago. Conversely, a reduction in the tari↵s
on textile imports from China (akin to a drop in F) may induce clothing manufacturers in
Europe to intensify price competition relative to the situation with higher tari↵s.
The e↵ect of a drop in the marginal cost of producing quality c is more standard. As
in the rational case, this shock increases quality provision. However, salience modulates the
strength of this e↵ect. The boost in quality provision is ampliﬁed at very high cost levels,
when there is over-provision of quality, while it is dampened in all other cases. This e↵ect is
again due to diminishing sensitivity: by reducing the level of prices, reductions in c render
consumers more attentive to price di↵erences, reducing ﬁrms’ incentive to increase quality.
Consider next the e↵ect of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock. Suppose that, starting from a symmetric
equilibrium, ﬁrm 1 acquires a cost advantage over its competitor. This enables ﬁrm 1 to
monopolize the market (see proofs in Appendix A). To analyze the new equilibrium, we
allow ﬁrm 1 to freely adjust its quality but keep the quality of ﬁrm 2 ﬁxed.10 For brevity,
we report only the e↵ects of reductions in the variable cost of providing quality.
Proposition 4 Suppose that, starting from the symmetric equilibrium of Equation (14), the
variable cost of ﬁrm 1 drops to c1 <c 2 = c and ﬁrm 1 can optimally reset its quality and
price. There are two cases:
i) The cost shock is large, c1 <c / 2. Then, ﬁrm 1 monopolizes the market by boosting both
its quality and its price.
ii) The cost shock is small, c1 >c / 2. Then, there is a threshold b F>0 such that ﬁrm 1
10Forcing ﬁrm 2 to keep the initial quality is not a signiﬁcant restriction. Having a dominated technology,
ﬁrm 2 is in fact certain of losing the market. As a consequence, it is weakly optimal for it not to alter its
quality provision. In general, in a game in which ﬁrm 2 can freely choose its quality in response to the
cost shock, there are several quality levels consistent with equilibrium. To make predictions one needs an
equilibrium reﬁnement criterion. Assuming that ﬁrm 2 does not adjust to the cost shock is one possible
reﬁnement criterion, based on the idea that ﬁrms face some inertia in adjusting their quality level, and so
they keep quality constant unless it is strictly beneﬁcial for them to do otherwise. See Online Appendix 3
for a more detailed characterization of asymmetric equilibria.
21boosts its quality and price if and only if F   b F.I fF<b F, ﬁrm 1 keeps its quality constant
at the competitor’s level  /c, and monopolizes the market by slightly cutting its price.
The size of the cost shock plays a critical role. If the variable cost reduction is drastic, or
if the ﬁxed cost of quality is high (i.e. F   b F), ﬁrm 1 can win the market by boosting quality
provision. In this case, prices tend not to be salient, because average costs are high, and
therefore quality di↵erences can be large. A substantial quality upgrading alters the market
outcome, changing the equilibrium from price- to quality- salient. As ﬁrm 1 provides extra
quality, its product’s overall quality becomes salient, raising consumers’ willingness to pay
even for infra-marginal quality units. In this sense, the quality add on acts as a complement
to baseline quality, greatly increasing the price that ﬁrm 1 can charge for its product. This
logic provides the testable predictions: i) quality add-ons are prevalent for higher quality
(and more expensive) goods, and ii) the level of add-ons provided should respond positively
to increases to the ﬁxed cost of quality, and to reductions of the marginal cost of quality.
Matters are di↵erent when the cost shock is small, c1 >c / 2, and the ﬁxed cost is low (i.e.,
F<b F). Now prices tend to be salient because of low average cost of quality, and the small
cost advantage also makes it very costly for ﬁrm 1 to engineer a drastic increase in quality.
In this case, quality upgrades make the associated price hikes salient, and thus backﬁre. As a
consequence, it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to keep its quality constant at the symmetric equilibrium
level, and to capture the market by lowering its price below the competitor’s. This outcome,
which is puzzling in a rational model, looks natural from the perspective of salience: in a
price-salient equilibrium quality upgradings are neglected, and ﬁrms exploit lower costs to
cut prices.
An important implication of this analysis is that price-salient equilibria are very stable,
particularly for low cost industries. To escape a commoditized market, an individual ﬁrm
must develop a drastic innovation that allows it to provide su ciently higher quality than
its competitors, and at such reasonable prices that quality can become salient. Small cost
reducing innovations neither beat the “commodity magnet”nor lead to marginal quality
improvements. They just translate into lower prices.
This result more generally illustrates the working of our model when costs are asymmetric.
The low cost ﬁrm wins the market, but whether it does so by setting higher quality or lower
22price depends on the extent of its cost advantage. If it has a large cost advantage, the low
cost ﬁrm captures the market by setting a salient high quality. If the cost advantage is small,
the low cost ﬁrm captures the market by setting a salient low price.
In Proposition 4, the strategy of the losing ﬁrm 2 is held at the quality it would set in
as y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i u mw h e r eb o t hﬁ r m sh a v ec o s tc2(q). This is a plausible reﬁnement
to study the e↵ect of an innovation shock, but may be less appealing to study the equilib-
rium arising under permanently di↵erent cost functions. In Online Appendix 3, we describe
asymmetric equilibria more generally, where the high cost ﬁrm 2 is not constrained to the
quality level given by (14). Although the results focus on the case where F =0 ,t h e yc l o s e l y
mirror Proposition 4. The only di↵erence is that when the cost advantage of ﬁrm 1 is low,
equilibria may arise in which – instead of producing the same quality – the low cost ﬁrm
wins the market by providing less quality than the high cost ﬁrm. This is a further depar-
ture from the rational benchmark: the low cost ﬁrm may deliberately provide lower quality
precisely to make its lower price salient to the consumer.
5 Applications
We now apply our model to discuss some actual innovations. In Section 5.1 we discuss
entry of Southwest into the airline market and entry of Starbucks into the co↵ee market. In
Section 5.2 we show that our model can capture some features of recent ﬁnancial innovations
in securities markets.
5.1 Southwest and Starbucks
The rise of low cost airlines in the U.S. is directly linked to deregulation that started in the
late seventies. Deregulation enabled carriers to freely set routes and prices, but also freed
entry into the industry. Aside from the removal of price controls, these developments entailed
a major reduction in the costs of operating an airline. New entrants such as Southwest
implemented large price cuts. Traditional carriers, burdened with legacy costs, were unable
to respond. Prices have declined steadily since deregulation, but some aspects of the quality
of airline service have also declined.
23Our model accounts for these events as the outcome of a transition from a quality to a
price salient equilibrium. In the pre-deregulation era, the equilibrium was quality salient.
High operating costs F rendered small di↵erences in airfares non-salient. Airlines competed
by o↵ering visible extra services to consumers. High quality and high prices went hand
in hand. Deregulation shifted the equilibrium from quality to price salient. The drop in
operating costs F created the opportunity for new entrants to implement large price cuts.
In the new price salient equilibrium, ﬁrms cut their quality to reduce prices even further.
The budget air travel market thus became commoditized, characterized by low prices and
low quality.11
These phenomena can also be described by a standard model with heterogeneous con-
sumers. In this setting, equilibrium fares are initially so expensive that only wealthy (and
thus price inelastic) consumers can a↵ord to ﬂy. Airlines cater to these consumers by pro-
viding high quality. As deregulation causes operating costs F to fall, poorer (and thus
price-elastic) consumers enter the market. This intensiﬁes price competition. If the inﬂow
of price elastic consumers is large, quality provision may also drop.
In comparing these alternative accounts, note that only the salience model can explain
why the market became commoditized, in the speciﬁc sense of inducing all consumers –
even the wealthier ones – to become more price sensitive. In the standard model, original
consumers continue to be price insensitive, and price competition intensiﬁes just because
price-sensitive consumers join the market.12 At the same time, it is clear that after deregula-
tion less a✏uent consumers increasingly used air travel, which is consistent with the rational
explanation. A cleaner way to test our model is to consider markets where the composition
11Competition on quality in the pre-deregulation era might also be viewed as driven by price controls.
When considering the role of price controls, two points should be noted. First, in the pre-deregulation era
price controls merely speciﬁed a standard of “reasonableness” for prices. In principle, this rule did not
prevent airlines to engage in small scale price competition (potentially a↵ecting the standard price level
itself). Of course, salience could be a reason why competition did not ignite a succession of “reasonable”
price cuts: being small, such price cuts would not be noticed by consumers. In this sense, price controls and
salience may be complementary forces.
12Commoditization seems critical to create a strong incentive for companies to cut quality. If all legacy
consumers were willing to buy expensive high-quality tickets, one might have expected deregulation to
increase the size of business class or create a large market segment specialized in serving price insensitive
ﬂyers. If instead all consumers become relatively more price sensitive, the reduction in quality occurs across
the board, sparing perhaps only existing business class seats, which remain characterized by a high ﬁxed
cost F of airplane space.
24of demand does not change over time.
To this end, consider the evolution of the co↵ee shop market. In the 1970’s, sellers of
drip co↵ee at neighbourhood co↵ee-shops and fast food restaurants o↵ered low quality co↵ee
at low prices. In this initial regime, innovations, such as free reﬁlls, e↵ectively translated
into price cuts instead of quality increases. In the 1980’s, ﬁrms such as Starbucks and Pete’s
Co↵ee & Tea ﬁgured out how to deliver a much higher quality co↵ee at only a reasonable extra
cost. This included serving expresso drinks but also training baristas to ensure consistency of
the product, and providing a “cafe” experience through a comfortable in-shop environment.
These ﬁrms gained market share by boosting the quality of their co↵ee as well as their prices.
Our model suggests the following account. The low quality and thus low prices prevailing
in the 70’s locked co↵ee sellers into a price salient equilibrium. The market was commoditized
so that, consistent with Proposition 4, marginal innovations took the form of price reduc-
tions rather than quality upgrades. After inventing a way to drastically reduce the costs of
producing quality, Starbucks could engineer a salient quality improvement. In the new qual-
ity salient equilibrium, much higher prices could be charged. Starbucks’ well-documented
growth trajectory, while extreme, reﬂects the growth of the premium co↵ee market, which
was successfully de-commoditized.
It is not easy to describe these events based solely on consumer heterogeneity. Arguably,
the composition of co↵ee buyers has been stable over time. As a result, it is di cult to explain
why innovations in the co↵ee market changed from price-cutting to quality-improving. De-
commodization in this market seems to require a generalized increase in the taste for quality,
which is precisely what the salience model endogenously generates.
To take stock, the market wide predictions of the salience model are sometimes similar
to those generated by a rational model of consumer heterogeneity, as in the case of airlines,
and sometimes di↵erent, as in the case of the co↵ee market. Critically, in all applications the
distinctive prediction of the salience model is that market changes trigger common shifts in
the price sensitivity of all consumers. This provides a novel prediction of our model, which
can in principle be tested with individual-level data.13
13More broadly, salience and consumer heterogeneity may play complementary roles, in the sense that
salience may amplify existing heterogeneity. If one ﬁrm reduces price to attract price sensitive consumers,
and in the process makes price salient for all consumers, other ﬁrms face pressure to cut prices further.
255.2 Financial Innovation
Our model can shed light on the working of ﬁnancial innovation, and in the phenomenon of
“reaching for yield.” We describe innovations that occurred in the safe (AAA) asset market,
involving the creation of mortgage backed securities (MBS). A security i is characterized
by the expected return Ri it yields to investors (net of intermediation fees), and its risk
(variance) vi.T h ei n v e s t o r ’ s“ r a t i o n a l ”v a l u a t i o no fa s s e t( Ri,v i)i sm e a n - v a r i a n c e ,n a m e l y :
ui(Ri,v i)=Ri   vi.( 1 5 )
Under salient thinking, the investor overweights the more salient attribute, which can
be either risk or return. Suppose that the investor chooses between two securities i =1 ,2
and the salience function is   (·,·). The following cases can occur. If  (R1,R 2) >  (v1,v 2),
returns are salient and the investor values asset i at Ri    ·vi.I f (R1,R 2) <  (v1,v 2), risk
is salient and the investor values asset i at   · Ri   vi. Finally, if  (R1,R 2)= (v1,v 2), risk
and return are equally salient and the investor’s valuation is rational.
There are two ﬁnancial intermediaries i =1 ,2, each producing an identical security
delivering a gross expected return R with risk v.T h i s i s t h e n o - i n n o v a t i o n b e n c h m a r k ,
in which both intermediaries produce an identical “standard” asset (perhaps because it is
prohibitively costly to innovate). Given our emphasis on safe assets, we think of these
standard securities as government-issued debt.
Intermediaries compete by o↵ering a net return Ri  R to investors, who must decide
with which intermediary to invest. If Ri < R,t h en e tr e t u r no ↵ e r e db yﬁ r mi entails a
positive intermediation fee. If Ri = R,t h i sf e ei sz e r o .C o m p e t i t i o nt h e nw o r k sa si nS e c t i o n
2, where quality and cost are ﬁxed.14 Each intermediary o↵ers a net of fee return Ri,w h i c hi s
analogous to product quality, at the cost to the investor of bearing risk v,w h i c hi sa n a l o g o u s
to price. As a consequence, the upside of the asset with the highest ratio of return to risk
Similarly, salience ampliﬁes the perceived di↵erentiation in markets where products are very similar. By
focusing the consumers’ attention on the (potentially small) di↵erences between goods, salience allows for
high markups which would otherwise require very high (even implausible) levels of consumer heterogeneity.
14The only di↵erence is that in the setting of Section 2, ﬁrms’ pricing strategies determine the cost for
consumers to buy the good, while here the ﬁrms’ pricing strategies determine the “quality” of the asset for
the investor (namely the investor’s return), while cost is exogenously given by the asset’s risk.
26Ri/vi is salient, causing that asset to be overvalued relative to its competitor’s. Because
ﬁrms are identical and returns are given exogenously, the following equilibrium benchmark
holds both in the rational case and with salient thinkers.
Lemma 4 With no innovation, ﬁrms pledge their net returns to the investor, R1 = R2 = R,
the investor is indi↵erent between the two ﬁrms, and ﬁrms make zero proﬁts.
As in standard Bertrand competition, the two ﬁrms selling the same asset make zero
proﬁts, o↵ering the totality of the return R to the investor (under salient thinking, the logic
is the same as that of Proposition 1).
Against this benchmark, we model ﬁnancial innovation as the creation by one ﬁrm of a
technology to generate excess return at only a moderate extra risk. We allow the innovating
ﬁrm, say 1, to increase the return of its asset to:
R + ↵,
where ↵ is the new asset’s excess return. The asset’s risk then increases to:
v +
c
2
· ↵
2,
where c captures the (low) marginal cost - in terms of added risk - of creating excess return
↵. Firm 2 continues to produce the standard asset (R,v). The no-innovation benchmark
can be viewed as the extreme case where c is prohibitively high for both ﬁrms.
With fully rational investors, the working of innovation is straightforward. In the spirit
of Lemma 2, the innovating ﬁrm: i) captures the entire market by o↵ering the investor a net
return of R +( c/2) · ↵2 (which compensates the investor for bearing the extra risk), and ii)
sets ↵ to maximize its proﬁt:
max
↵ ↵   (c/2) · ↵
2 (16)
which implies ↵⇤ =1 /c.T h el o w e ri st h ee x t r ar i s kc,t h eg r e a t e ri st h ee x c e s sr e t u r np r o m i s e d
by the new asset. As ﬁrm 1 manufactures an asset with a better return/risk combination,
its proﬁt and thus social welfare rise (the investor is left indi↵erent).
27In the case of salient thinking, the critical question is whether, compared to the standard
security, the new security’s risk or return is salient. Depending on which attribute is salient,
the ﬁrm will have an incentive to create a particular return vs. risk proﬁle. The reason is
that under salience the investor’s risk appetite endogenously depends on the salient features
of the new asset. The new equilibrium is as follows.
Proposition 5 The innovating ﬁrm 1 captures the market and makes positive proﬁts. The
optimal excess return satisﬁes:
↵
⇤ =
8
<
:
1
 ·c for R< · v
v
R · 1
c for R     · v
. (17)
Relative to the rational benchmark, under salient thinking there is excessive risk taking if
R<vand too little risk taking if R>v .
The innovation is particularly successful when investors focus on the extra return o↵ered
by the new asset and underweight the extra risk that comes with it. As Proposition 5
illustrates, this is the case precisely when the net return R of the standard asset is low.
Diminishing sensitivity generates a “reach for yield” at low interest rates: an excess return
of, say, 0.5% is much more salient when the baseline return is 1% than when the baseline
return is 6%.15’16
Critically, Proposition 5 shows that in this case ﬁnancial intermediaries have an incentive
to manufacture excessively risky products. When investors focus on return, they underweight
15If one views the baseline return R as a net return generated after defraying the intermediary’s operating
costs, the same intuition may explain why banks take more risk when their operating costs are higher. If
intermediaries react to higher operating costs (i.e. a lower R) by cutting the net return paid to investors (as
the rational model would predict), consumers would ﬁnd this an unattractive deal, reducing their demand,
and the intermediary’s proﬁt. If instead the intermediary takes more risk, investors focus on its excess return.
Because the investors underweight the asset’s risk, the intermediary can increase fees. These fees allow the
intermediary not only to cover its higher operating costs, but also generate proﬁts.
16Proposition 5 also shows that ﬁnancial innovations geared at creating excess returns are much less
successful when net returns are already high. In this case, the investor is much less sensitive to a given
increase in return, and the innovating ﬁrm must keep the risks of the new asset very low, lest the investors
focus on them. In this case, there is too little risk taking, in the sense that the intermediary selects an excess
return in (17) below its rational counterpart in (16). Although for simplicity we have not allowed for this
possibility, here the intermediary may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to reduce excess returns and risks relative to the
standard asset.
28risk. As a consequence, the intermediary is able to extract large fees without compensating
investors for the risk they are bearing.
An important implication of this analysis is that, when investors’ attention is drawn to
returns, risks are relatively speaking neglected, and investors are disappointed when par-
ticularly bad returns render risk salient. In Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012, 2013),
we modeled this neglect of risk investors’ disregard of tail events. We also presented some
evidence consistent with the prediction that downside risks were neglected in the period
preceding the 2007 – 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The salience approach makes a similar point in
a perhaps subtler way. During the “reach for yield” episodes where interest rates are low,
investors are prone to be inattentive to risks. When investors underweighting risks, they
engage in too much risk taking. When bad states of the world materialize, these investors
wish they had paid more attention.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how salience changes some of the basic predictions of a standard model of
competition with vertical product di↵erentiation. Yet the paper has only begun to explore
the consequences of salience for market competition. Rather than summarizing our results,
in conclusion we mention some issues we have not addressed, but which may be interesting
to investigate. These include dynamics of competition, welfare, horizontal product di↵eren-
tiation, and advertising. We have not solved any of these problems, so the discussion here
is strictly conjectural.
In a dynamic setting, the salience of a ﬁrm’s strategy is not only shaped by the background
of its competitors, but also by past market outcomes. As we formalized in BGS (2013), the
price of a product is salient not only if the product looks expensive relative to substitute
goods available today, but also if it looks expensive relative to yesterday’s prices. This result
has interesting implications for the dynamics of entry and imitation. In particular, these
dynamics may be very di↵erent depending on whether the original innovation ultimately
leads to quality-salient or price-salient long run equilibrium. If an innovator ﬁnds a way
to escape the commodity magnet and produce higher quality at a higher price, the pace
29at which this change is implemented, and imitated, might be relatively slow. The reason
is that ﬁrms need to keep quality rather than price salient, and prevent consumers from
becoming focused on price increases. This slows down innovation. As an extreme example,
if consumers are used to free education, as they are in Europe, charging for education might
be extremely di cult even with signiﬁcant quality improvements because the focus will be
entirely on prices. (Of course, once prices are high enough, the pace of innovation and price
increases accelerates.) In contrast, precisely because consumers are focused on prices and
neglect quality, innovation that reduces price and quality will be extremely fast. The slide
to the commodity magnet will be faster than in a rational model.
We have shown that – under the natural assumption that consumer welfare is measured
by the undistorted utility – quality provision is generally ine cient in a duopoly, as a con-
sequence of competition for attention between the two ﬁrms. An assessment of the welfare
consequences of competition when consumers are salient thinkers would require a deeper
understanding of the model with heterogeneous consumers, and in particular of monopoly
and free entry.
Our approach might also be used to study horizontal di↵erentiation, and to investigate the
marketing dictum of “di↵erentiate in any way you can” (Levitt 1983). If a ﬁrm horizontally
di↵erentiates its product from competitors, then di↵erences along the di↵erentiated attribute
become salient, and will attract consumers’ attention. At the same time, di↵erences in
prices, which are similar across alternatives, will become non salient. In fact, ﬁrms might
di↵erentiate their products precisely to segment the market between consumers attracted to
di↵erent attributes, and thus earn higher proﬁts. This approach has clear applications to
product markets, but it might also shed light on political competition, where it can reverse
the median voter result in a plausible way. It would suggest that politicians might perhaps
converge to the median voter viewpoint on some positions, but also seek to di↵erentiate
their views on dimensions that voters might ﬁnd salient (and attractive). The two parties in
the United States converge on their views on Social Security, for example, making sure that
voters do not pay attention to that issue, but then seek to di↵erentiate on the issues they
choose, such as immigration or gay marriage.
Finally, salience may have signiﬁcant implications for how we think about advertising,
30which deals precisely with drawing consumer attention to products and their attributes.
Economists distinguish two broad approaches to advertising: informative and persuasive.
The former focuses on provision of hard information about the product; the latter deals with
its more emotional appeal. Salience suggests that in fact the two approaches are intimately
related, and usually integrated: a key purpose of advertising is to inform about and thus draw
attention to the attributes of the product that the seller wants the consumer to think about,
but not others. Gas stations sell regular and super gasoline, even though the di↵erence in
octane content is only about 3%. Advertising of attributes is simultaneously informative
(sometimes about prices, sometimes about quality, rarely both) and persuasive in that the
salience of the attributes being advertised is enhanced. The purpose of advertising is precisely
to let some desirable attributes of the product stand out for the potential customers.
In all these situations, ﬁrms compete to attract attention to the attributes they want
consumers to attend to, and to distract attention from their less attractive attributes.
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34AP r o o f s
Lemma 1 (price competition under rationality). When   =1t h e r ea r en os a l i e n c e
distortions and utility is given by Equation (1). We also assume that ﬁrms do not price
below cost (as that might imply negative proﬁts)17,s ow er e s t r i c tpk   ck for k =1 ,2.
If q1  c1 >q 2  c2 then ﬁrm 1 sets price p1 = c2 +(q1  q2) and ﬁrm 2 sets price p2 = c2.
Firm 2 has no incentive to deviate to another price, since it cannot satisfy the participation
constraint while making non-negative proﬁts, (and ). Firm 1 has no incentive to deviate
from p1,s i n c ei tc a n n o ti n c r e a s ep r i c ew i t h o u tv i o l a t i n gt h ep a r t i c i p a t i o nc o n s t r a i n t ,a n di t
cannot decrease price without reducing proﬁts. If q1   c1 <q 2   c2,t h ea r g u m e n tc a r r i e s
through switching ﬁrms 1 and 2. Finally, if q1   c1 = q2   c2,t h e nb o t hﬁ r m sp r i c ea tc o s t
and share the market. We assume that having market share has some value to the ﬁrm,
so that each ﬁrm strictly prefers to share the market while making zero proﬁts to having
zero market share. In this case, neither ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate: increasing price
would violate the participation constraint, decreasing the price would imply making negative
proﬁts.
Proposition 1 (price competition under salient thinking). When  <1, utility is
given by Equation (2), where salience determines the relative weight of quality and price.
We proceed under assumption A.1. As we show below, this assumption further implies that,
in equilibrium, the good that wins the price competition sets the price so that its relative
advantage is salient (i.e. the salience constraint weakly binds).
If q1/c1 >q 2/c2, then assumption A.1 implies that ﬁrm 1 gains the market by set-
ting p1 su ciently close to c1.T h i s e n s u r e s t h a t q u a l i t y i s s a l i e n t f o r b o t h g o o d s , a n d
as a consequence consumers choose good 1. Since ﬁrm 2 loses the market, it sets price
at p2 = c2. Firm 1 then hikes up price subject to the constraint that quality is salient
17Formally, if ﬁrm k loses the market in equilibrium, setting pk = ck is a weakly dominant strategy for
ﬁrm k.I fq1   c1 >q 2   c2 then ﬁrm 1 sets price p1 = p2 +( q1   q2) and ﬁrm 2 sets price p2 in the range
p2 2 [c1   (q1   q2),c 2]. In equilibrium, p2 >c 2 cannot obtain since by reducing its price ﬁrm 2 could then
proﬁtably capture the market. Moreover, p2 <c 1 (q1 q2) can also not obtain in equilibrium since it would
imply that both ﬁrms price below cost, making it beneﬁcial for either ﬁrm to raise prices. Within the range
[c1   (q1   q2),c 2], setting p2 = c2 is weakly dominant since a tremble play by ﬁrm 1 results in zero, instead
of negative, proﬁts.
35and to the participation constraint (conditional on quality being salient), namely p1 =
min
 
c2 · q1/q2,c 2 + 1
 (q1   q2)
 
, see constraints (4,5). Firm 1 has no incentive to devi-
ate from this price. To see why, suppose the salience constraint is binding, c2 · q1/q2 <
c2 + 1
 (q1   q2). Then raising the price p1 above the salience constraint makes price salient,
and the participation constraint becomes p1 <c 2 +  (q1   q2). However, A.1 requires
c2 +  (q1   q2) <c 1,w h i c ht o g e t h e rw i t h
q1
c1 >
q2
c2 implies that the participation constraint
is violated. By increasing price to the point where it becomes salient, ﬁrm 1 shifts the con-
sumer’s attention to its downside, and lowers the consumer’s valuation to the point where
it loses the market. Suppose instead that the participation constraint is binding. Then, by
construction, any deviation in price leads to a decrease in proﬁts.18
When q2/c2 >q 1/c1,a n da sar e s u l tﬁ r m1s e t sp r i c ep1 = c1 and ﬁrm 2 sets price
p2 =m i n{c1 · q2/q1,c 1 +  (q2   q1)}, see constraints (6,7). Now price is salient, because ﬁrm
2h a sl o w e rp r i c e ,l o w e rq u a l i t yb u th i g h e rq u a l i t yp r i c er a t i ot h a nﬁ r m1 .T os e ew h yt h i s
is an equilibrium, an argument similar to the above carries through. For instance, suppose
that salience is binding for ﬁrm 2, namely, c1 · q2/q1 <c 1 +  (q2   q1). Then reducing p2
decreases proﬁts, while increasing p2 takes ﬁrm 2 into a quality salient equilibrium, where
the participation constraint reads p2  c1+ 1
 (q2 q1). Because the consumer now overvalues
the quality di↵erences across goods, his relative valuation of good 2 decreases drastically.
Assumption A.1 then ensures the participation constraint is violated. Firm 1 has no incentive
to change price, since increasing the price does not win the market, and decreasing the price
might lead to negative proﬁts if it does sell the good (notice the asymmetry in the ﬁrms’
best responses, which comes from the fact that ﬁrm 2 can explore asymmetries in salience
ranking when it is dominated, but ﬁrm 1 cannot).
Lemma 2 (quality competition under rationality). We are interested in pure strategy,
18Firm 2 might hike up its price to the point where the price of good 1 is salient. That would require
setting p2 >p 1, making good 2 a dominated good. When one good dominates the other, their salience
rankings may be di↵erent, potentially allowing good 2 to be quality salient while good 1 is price salient. In
fact, diminishing sensitivity implies that: i) the salience of quality is larger for the lower quality ﬁrm 2 than
for ﬁrm 1, and ii) as ﬁrm 2 raises p2 over p1, price salience increases for ﬁrm 1 faster than for ﬁrm 2. So there
is a range of prices where good 2 may be quality salient while the dominating good 1 is price salient, in which
case good 2 is overvalued relative to good 1. This feature of the model occurs because salience distortions
depend only on salience ranking. As we show in BGS (2013), under continuous salience weighting valuation
is monotonic. To avoid this problem, we restrict optimisation in the price competition stage to p2  p1.
36sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. Consider ﬁrst the case where ﬁrms have the same cost
structure. In the price competition stage, the ﬁrm that generates the highest surplus wins
the market or shares it. As a consequence, in the ﬁrst stage of the game each ﬁrm i = k, k
sets quality q⇤ to maximize its own surplus qi  ci(qi). Since ﬁrms are identical, both set the
same quality q⇤ that satisﬁes c0
1(q⇤)=c0
2(q⇤)=1 .
Suppose now ﬁrm 1 has lower costs than ﬁrm 2. In the price competition stage, ﬁrm 1
wins the market, sets price p1 = c2(q2)+(q1 q2)a n dg e n e r a t e sp r o ﬁ t sc2(q2) c1(q1)+(q1 q2).
Consider now the choice of quality. As explained in footnote 7, we assume that the ﬁrm that
loses the market chooses a surplus maximizing quality (this corresponds to a trembling hand
perfect equilibrium). Proﬁts are maximised when quality q⇤
1 satisﬁes c0
1(q⇤
1)=v0
1(q⇤
1)=1 .I n
particular, if ﬁrm 1 has the same marginal cost function but a lower ﬁxed cost than ﬁrm 2,
then in the ﬁrst stage both ﬁrms set quality q⇤ satisfying v0
1(q⇤)=v0
2(q⇤)=1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,
ﬁrm 1 sets price p1 = F2 F1.I fﬁ r m1h a sl o w e rm a r g i n a lc o s t s ,t h e ni tc o m m i t st oah i g h e r
quality, q⇤
1 >q ⇤
2 since v0
1(q⇤
1)=v0
2(q⇤
2)=1b u tv0
1(q)  v0
2(q).
Lemma 3 (best response under salient thinking). Consider two ﬁrms, k and  k
with cost functions ck(·), c k(·). Denote ﬁrm  k’s average costs by A k = c k(q k)/q k.
In deriving ﬁrm k’s best response on quality, we consider prices p⇤
k(qk,q  k)a n dp⇤
 k(qk,q  k)
to be set competitively at the price competition stage as a function of qualities q⇤
k,q⇤
 k.
When quality is salient ex post (at the price competition stage), ﬁrm k’s best response
features q⇤
k   q⇤
 k and pk = c k(q k)+m i n
 
A k, 1
 
 
(qk   q k). To see this, note that when
A k < 1
  the price condition becomes the (binding) salience constraint, pk/qk = A k,w h i l e
for A k > 1
  it becomes the (binding) participation constraint conditional on quality being
salient. In particular, the price condition above ensures that ﬁrm k provides a weakly higher
quality to price ratio than ﬁrm  k.
In contrast, when price is salient ex post, ﬁrm k’s best response features q⇤
k  q⇤
 k and
pk = c k(q k)+m a x{A k, }(qk   q k). Again, this ensures ﬁrm k has a weakly higher
quality to price ratio than ﬁrm  k.
We now consider ﬁrm k’s best response case by case: if A k 2
⇥
 , 1
 
⇤
,ﬁ r mk sets quality
c0
k(q⇤
k)=A k.S i n c e c o s t s a r e c o n v e x , t h e m a r g i n a l c o s t c0
k(q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq u a l i t yq.
37Thus, if c0
k(q⇤
 k) <A  k = c0
k(q⇤
k)i tf o l l o w st h a tq⇤
k >q ⇤
 k and quality is salient. Similarly, if
c0
k(q⇤
 k) >A  k = c0
k(q⇤
k)i tf o l l o w st h a tq⇤
k <q ⇤
 k and price is salient.
If A k > 1/ ,t w op o s s i b i l i t i e sa r i s e .I fc0
k(q⇤
 k) >A  k then ﬁrm k sets quality so that
c0
k(q⇤
k)=A k leading to a price salient outcome, in which q⇤
k <q ⇤
 k.I fi n s t e a dc0
k(q⇤
 k) <A  k,
then ﬁrm k maximizes proﬁts by setting quality such that c0
k(q⇤
k)=1 / ,a sl o n ga sq u a l i t yi s
salient and in particular q⇤
k >q ⇤
 k. As q⇤
 k increases, ﬁrm k can no longer maintain a salient
advantage, either by increasing quality or by cutting quality. Therefore, its best response is
to set q⇤
k = q⇤
 k.
If A k <  ,a g a i nt w op o s s i b i l i t i e sa r i s e . I fc0
k(q⇤
 k) <A  k then ﬁrm k sets quality
so that c0
k(q⇤
k)=A k leading to a quality salient outcome, in which q⇤
k >q ⇤
 k.I f i n s t e a d
c0
k(q⇤
 k) <A  k,t h e nﬁ r mk maximizes proﬁts by setting quality such that c0
k(q⇤
k)= ,a s
long as price is salient and in particular q⇤
k <q ⇤
 k. As q⇤
 k decreases, ﬁrm k can no longer
maintain a salient advantage and its best response is to set q⇤
k = q⇤
 k.
Proposition 2 (symmetric equilibrium under salient thinking). We ﬁrst show that
any pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is symmetric. In equilibrium consumers must
be indi↵erent between the two products and ﬁrms share the market (this is because, as is
standard, we assume that each ﬁrm prefers to share the market while making zero proﬁts
to being driven out of the market). In particular, no ﬁrm’s advantage can be salient. As a
consequence, the two following conditions must hold: q1/c1(q1)=q2/c2(q2)a n dq1 c1(q1)=
q2   c2(q2). Together, these conditions imply q1 = q2 and necessarily c(q1)=c(q2).
We now show that in (symmetric) equilibrium, both ﬁrms provide equilibrium quality
qS given in equation (13). In fact, if ﬁrms provide any other quality, Lemma 3 shows that
it is optimal to deviate. We begin by examining ﬁrm 1’s incentives to deviate from this
conﬁguration. Consider the case where ﬁrm 2’s average cost c(qS)/qS lie in the interval
[ ,1/ ]. This translates into the restriction that F 2 [ q v(q),q/  v(q)]. Then, according
to Lemma 3, ﬁrm 1’s best response is to set quality q⇤ such that c0(q⇤)=c(ˆ q)/ˆ q which
precisely implies q⇤ =ˆ q (recall that, because costs are convex, the average-cost-minimizing
quality satisﬁes c0(ˆ q)=c(ˆ q)/ˆ q).
Consider now the case where c(qS)/qS > 1/ ,o re q u i v a l e n t l yF>q/    v(q). Now ﬁrm
381’s best response is to set c0(q⇤)=1
 ,p r o v i d e dq⇤   qS.B u ti nf a c t ,q⇤ and qS satisfy the
same condition, c0(q⇤)=c0(qS)=c0(q)=1 / ,a n dt h e r e f o r et h eb e s tr e s p o n s ec o i n c i d e sa g a i n
with the equilibrium quality q. Finally, when c(qS)/qS < or equivalently F<  q  v(q),
ﬁrm 1’s best response is to set c0(q⇤)= ,p r o v i d e dq⇤  qS. An analogous argument then
shows that q⇤ = q,c o n c l u d i n gt h ea r g u m e n tt h a tt h i sc o n ﬁ g u r a t i o ni sa ne q u i l i b r i u m .
Corollary 1 (symmetric equilibrium for quadratic costs). Consider quadratic costs,
where v(q)=c
2q2. Then c0(q)=c · q so that q = 1
 c,a n dq =  
c.M o r e o v e r , F = 1
2 2c and
F =  2
2c. Finally, ˆ q satisﬁes c0(ˆ q)=c(ˆ q)/ˆ q,w h i c hy i e l d sˆ q =
p
2F/c.
Proposition 3 (industry wide cost shocks). Under the symmetric equilibrium of
Equation (14), consider an increase in the ﬁxed cost of all ﬁrms, from F0 to F1 >F 0. If the
interval [F0,F 1]h a san o n - e m p t yo v e r l a pw i t ht h ei n t e r v a l[ F,F], then equilibrium quality
strictly increases from max{ /c,
p
2F0/c} to min{
p
2F1/c,1/( c)}.O t h e r w i s e ,e q u i l i b r i u m
quality provision does not change, staying at  /c if F1 <For at 1/( c)i fF0 > F.
Note that, when  <1, the equilibrium quality can be written as 1
c · A(c,F), where
A(c,F) = max{ ,min{
p
2Fc,1/ }}. As a consequence, following an increase in the marginal
cost of producing quality for all ﬁrms, quality provision strictly decreases. Consider a
marginal increase in c. When is the change in quality provision in reaction to the cost
shock larger than in the rational case? When   =1 ,q u a l i t yp r o v i s i o ne q u a l s1 /c.T h e r e f o r e ,
the change in quality provision increases when  <1i fa n do n l yi fA(c,F) > 1, namely when
quality is over provided to begin with (i.e. if F>1
2c).
Proposition 4 (ﬁrm speciﬁc cost shocks). Starting from the symmetric equilibrium
of Equation (14), let the marginal cost of ﬁrm 1 drop to c1 <c 2 = c.T h i si m p l i e st h a t ,a t
the symmetric quality level, ﬁrm 1’s marginal costs are below ﬁrm 2’s average costs. From
Lemma 3 we know that ﬁrm 1 responds to the cost shock by weakly increasing quality. We
ﬁrst compute ﬁrm 1’s best response from the equilibrium quality provision, and then show
that ﬁrm 2 has no incentive to deviate.
39When the ﬁxed costs are su ciently high, F> 2
2c,t h ea v e r a g ec o s t so fﬁ r m2s a t i s f y
c(qS)/qS >  .I t t h e n f o l l o w s f r o m L e m m a 3 t h a t ﬁ r m 1 ’ s b e s t r e s p o n s e i s t o e n g i n e e r a
salient quality increase. When c(qS)/qS < 1/ ,ﬁ r m1s e t sq⇤
1 = qS · c
c1 >q S. Firm 2 has no
incentive to deviate because it is already minimizing average cost, so it cannot engineer a
quality innovation that gives it a salient advantage which, together with the fact that it has
higher costs, precludes any proﬁtable deviation. When the average costs of ﬁrm 2 exceed 1/ ,
ﬁrm 1 boosts quality to 1/ c1,w h i c hi sa b o v eﬁ r m2 ’ sq u a l i t yp r o v i s i o no f1 / c. Firm 2 again
has no incentive to deviate, since increasing quality (thereby diminishing average costs below
that of its competitor, if possible) is never proﬁtable: if ﬁrm 2 engineers a salient quality
advantage then it decreases perceived surplus, while if it creates a salient price advantage it
cannot price above cost.
Consider now the case where F< 2
2c. While ﬁrm 2 sets qS =  /c,ﬁ r m1 ’ sb e s tr e s p o n s e
is to set q⇤
1 =
c(qS)/qS
c1 ,p r o v i d e dq⇤
1 >q S.T h i s r e q u i r e s F> 2
c
 
c1
c   1
2
 
.T h u s , i f ﬁ r m 1 ’ s
cost advantage is su ciently large, namely c1 <c / 2, then ﬁrm 1 strictly increases quality
provision. If instead ﬁrm 1’s cost advantage is small, c1 >c / 2, then for low enough levels
of the ﬁxed cost F, it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to keep quality provision at the equilibrium level
prior to the shock, q⇤
1 =  /c,a n dt r a n s l a t ei t sc o s ta d v a n t a g ei n t op r o ﬁ t sb ys e t t i n gp r i c e
p1 = c( /c). Finally, ﬁrm 2 has no incentive to deviate because decreasing quality (thereby
diminishing average costs) also decreases perceived surplus.
Lemma 4 (returns competition under rationality). This setting is similar to the
price competition game of Lemma 1. While the costs facing investors are ﬁxed at v (the
security’s risk), intermediaries compete in terms of the return they provide investors. Since
intermediaries provide identical securities, this competition game only admits symmetric
equilibria. In particular, both ﬁrms o↵er the maximum return to investors, Ri F = R F,
and share the market. No intermediary has an incentive to deviate from this conﬁguration:
increasing the returns o↵ered to investors would lead to negative proﬁts, while decreasing
the returns would lead to the loss of the market share.
Proposition 5 (ﬁnancial innovation under salient thinking). Suppose ﬁrm 2 creates
40as e c u r i t yo fﬁ x e dt o t a lr e t u r na n dc o s t ,( R F, v). Firm 1 develops a ﬁnancial innovation
and can create a family of securities (R + ↵   F, v   c
2 · ↵2), indexed by ↵,t h ei n c r e a s ei n
returns relative to the competition. The ﬁrms play a two stage game: in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrm 1
chooses ↵, and in the second stage both ﬁrms choose how big a return to pledge to investors.
Firm 1 pledges return R↵ F where R↵ 2 [R,R+↵]s ot h a ti nt h er e t u r nc o m p e t i t i o ns t a g e
it sells security (R↵   F, v   c
2 · ↵2)a n dm a x i m i z e sp r o ﬁ t sR + ↵   R↵.
To determine the optimal choice of ↵,w eb e g i nb yn o t i c i n gt h a t ,f o r↵ su ciently small,
the marginal cost of quality for ﬁrm 1 is lower than its average cost. This is because returns
increase linearly in ↵, while risk increases quadratically. As a result, ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it optimal
to provide a salient increase in returns. The pledged returns R↵ must satisfy both the
constraint that returns are salient, and the participation constraint. The salience constraint
reads R↵  F>(R F)·
v+ c
2↵2
v (recall that ﬁrm 1 provides higher returns at a higher risk),
while the valuation constraint reads R↵ > R +   c
2↵2.T h e v a l u a t i o n c o n s t r a i n t i s b i n d i n g
when R>F+  v.I n t h i s c a s e ,ﬁ r m 1 m u s t p r o v i d e a t l e a s t R↵ = R +( R   F) c
2 ↵2.T o
maximize proﬁts R + ↵   R↵,ﬁ r m1s e t s↵ = 1
 c.
The salience constraint is binding when R   F + v.I nt h i sc a s e ,ﬁ r m1m u s tp r o v i d ea t
least R↵ = F +(R F)
 
1+ c
2v↵2 
.T om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁ t sR+↵ R↵,ﬁ r m1s e t s↵ = 1
R F · 1
c.
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